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federal courts) and in several state legislatures. Very probably it will
be revived in Michigan. The draft of a Uniform Act is before the
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The next few years, there-
fore, are likely to witness a generous recourse to this method of deter-
mining legal relations and to afford us an opportunity to establish the
efficacy of this reform in the administration of justice. .
E. M. B.
HAS AN ALIEN THE PRIVILEGE OF FREE SPEECH?
In the recent case of State v.-Sinchuk (1921) 96 Conn. 605, 115 Atl.
33, the Supreme Court of Connecticut held that the guaranties of the
privileges of free speech and of assembly contained in the Bill of Rights
of the State Constitution have no application to aliens, but are privileges
conferred upon citizens alone. Under this interpretation of the State
Constitution the defendant, an alien, was not permitted to attack the
constitutionality of the State Sedition Act,' for, not being possessed of
any political privileges under the Constitution it would be impossible for
himi to show that the Statute in question had deprived him of the priv-
ilege of free speech.2 This decision may be open to objection for two
reasons: (I) the language of the sixth section of the Connecticut Bill
of Rights probably does not justify its restriction to citizens alone; and
(2) the decision perhaps deprives the defendant of the equal protection
of the laws in violation of the first section of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Federal Constitution.3
3687 m, p. 253; Kansas, Laws, 1921, ch. i68; Florida, Laws, igig, ch. 7857, No.
75, P. 148.
The Superior Court of Los Angeles County, California, 1urnell, J., has just
held the California Statute unconstitutional, relying principally on the unsound
decision of the Michigan court in the Anway case. The Court was not apparently
aware of the Kansas decision. The case is, it is understood, now on appeal to the
California Supreme Court. Newberry v. Newberry, reported in the San Francisco
Recorder, Dec. 30, 1921.
IConn. Pub. Acts, 1919, ch. 312, entitled "An Act Concerning Sedition." The
act declares a punishment for speaking or publishing any disloyal, scurrilous, or
abusive matter concerning the form of government of the United States, its
military forces, flag or uniform, or any matter intended to ,bring them into
contempt, or which creates or fosters opposition to organized government The
still more drastic Act (Conn. Pub. Acts, 1919, ch. 191) against advocating in public
any doctrine intended to injuriously affect the state or federal government was not
involved. See COMMENTS (1919) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 108. The constitution-
ality of these statutes as to citizens is yet to be determined.
' Before any law can be attacked by any person on the ground that it is uncon-
stitutional it must be shown that its enforcement has violated or will violate his
constitutional privileges. Hooker v. Burr (19o4) 194 U. S. 415, 24 Sup. Ct. 7o6;
Citizens' National Bank v. Kentucky (1910) 217 U. S. 443, 30 Sup. Ct 532.
3 , nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." U. S. Const. Amendments, art. 14, sec. i.
COMMENTS
There is no doubt that sections two,4 five,5 and sixteen6 of the Con-
necticut Bill of Rights haveno application to aliens, but, as pointed out
by Chief "Justice Wheeler in his dissenting opinion, the wording of the
sixth section is sufficiently broad to afford aliens the privilege of free
speech This section provides that "no law shall ever be passed to
curtail the liberty 6f speech or of the press." It is a cardinal rule of
constitutional construction that unless the wording of a particular pro-
vision either specifically or by logical intendment restricts its guaranties
to a certain class, it will be construed as applying to everyone, whether
citizens or not.7  The majority, in the instant case, read sections five
and six together, and limited the broad language of section six by the
specific limitations of section five, which applied to citizens alone. This
seems a rather strained and unjustifiably narrow construction, quite
contrary to the rule of constitutional construction just mentioned. In
some cases the courts have held that an alien has no liberty of speech,
but these instances can easily be distinguished from the instant case.
In Goldman v. Reyburn, 8 where this result was reached, the Pennsyl-
vania Constitution specifically limited the guaranty of free speech to
citizens, and in United States v. Williams,9 a case often cited as hold-
ing that an alien does not possess this privilege, the Court merely
decided that the exclusion of alien anarchists from the United States by
act of Congress 0 does not constitute a violation of the privilege of free
speech, since Congress has the power to exclude aliens and to prescribe
the terms and conditions on which they enter. There is apparently no
authority to support the Connecticut Court in holding that an alien is
not protected by a constitutional guaranty so general in its scope as the
sixth section of the Connecticut Bill of Rights.
" Conn. Constitution, art. I, sec. 2. Referring to this section, Beach, J., in the
principal case said: "The right affirmed by this section ii the right of the people
to alter their form of government. It is because it is their own and instituted by
themselves for their own benefit that they have the right to alter it The proposi-
tion that aliens have an undeniable and indefeasible right to alter our form of
government will hardly bear statement"
"'Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty." Conn. Constitution,
art. i, sec. 5. Aliens can not enjoy the guaranties of this section as they are
specifically restricted to citizens.
"'The citizens have a right, in a peaceable manner, to assemble for their common
good, and apply to those invested with the powers of government for redress of
grievances, or other purposes, by petition, address or remonstrance." Conn. Con-
stitution, art 1, sec. 16. The guaranties of this section like those of section five
are specifically restricted to citizens alone.
Truax v. Raich (1915) 239 U. S. 33. 36 Sup. Ct 7; Yick Wo v. Hopkins
(1886) 118 U. S. 356, 6 Sup. Ct lO64; Ex Parte Case (1911) 20 Idaho, 128, Ii6
Pac. 1037.
'(igog) 36 Pa. Co. 58r. '(1904) 194 U. S. 279, 24 Sup. Ct 7ig.10The Alien Immigration Act Act of March 3, 1903 (32 Stat at L. 2r3).
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It is also rather difficult to disagree with the dissenting Chief Justice
in his contention that the construction placed upon the Connecticut
Constitution by the majority denies the defendant the equal lrotection
of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. That this is
due to aliens as well as citizens seems to be universally recognized. 1
It is not easy to understand how a state, having no power to exclude
aliens12 or to impose burdensome regulations upon their entry,13 can
arbitrarily discriminate 4 against them after they have come within its
jurisdiction. That the Connecticut Supreme Court did discriminate
between alien and citizen in denying the defendant the privilege of free
speech cannot be denied, and in so doing it appears that it may have
transgressed one of the limitations placed upon the power of the State
by the Fourteenth Amendment.1 5
It should be noted that in the instant case the particular language
alleged to have been used by the aliens in violation of the Statute was
not before the Court but only the general constitutional question.
1Truax v. Raich, supra note 7; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, supra note 7; Templar
v. State Examiners (19o2) 131 Mich. 254, go N. W. 1058; Ex Parte Kotta (1921,
Calif.) 2o0 Pac. 957; State v. Montgomery (19oo) 94 Me. 192, 47 Atl. 165. To
quote from the opinion in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, supra note 7; "These provisions
(referring to due process and and equal protection of the laws) are universal in
their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard
to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality." (Italics ours.)
State v. The Steamship "Constitution" (1872) 42 Calif. 578; Lin Sing v.
Washburn (1862) 2o Calif. 534.
'Passenger Cases (1849, U. S.) 7 How. 283; Ex Parte Ah Cue (1894) 1o1
Calif. 197, 35 Pac. 556.
"A state has the power to discriminate between citizens and aliens in the distri-
bution of its own resources. The common property of a state belongs to the
people of the state and citizens may be preferred in its distribution. McCready v.
Virginia (1876) 94 U. S. 391; People v. Crane (1915) 214 N. Y. 154, io8 N. E.
427; Atkin v. Kansas (19o3) 191 U. S. 207, 24 Sup. Ct. 124; Ex Parte Gilletti
(1915) 7o Fla. 442, 70 So. 446.
1" It is undoubtedly true that freedom of speech is one of the so-called "funda-
mental rights" safeguarded by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment.
"It should be observed of the terms (as used in the Fourteenth Amendment) 'life,'
'liberty,' and 'property' that they are representative terms and are intended and
must be understood to cover every right to which a member of the body politic is
entitled under the law .... The rights thus guaranteed are something more than
the mere privileges of locomotion; the guarantee is the negation of arbitrary
power in every form which results in the deprivation of right .... It would
be absurd, for instance, to say that arbitrary arrests were forbidden, but that the
freedom of speech, the freedom of religious worship, the right of self defence
against unlawful violence, the right freely to buy and sell as others may, or the
right in public schools found no protection here." (Italics ours.) 2 Story, The
Constitution (5th ed. i8gi) sec. 195o. Also see, Marx and Haas Jeans Clothing
Company v. Watson (19o2) 168 Mo. 133, 67 S. W. 391; Gillespie v. People (19oo)
188 Ill. 176, 58 N. E. ioo7.
